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Abstract
Autonomous vehicle (AV) software is typically
composed of a pipeline of individual components,
linking sensor inputs to motor outputs. Erroneous
component outputs propagate downstream, hence
safe AV software must consider the ultimate effect
of each component’s errors. Further, improving
safety alone is not sufficient. Passengers must also
feel safe to trust and use AV systems. To address
such concerns, we investigate three under-explored
themes for AV research: safety, interpretability, and
compliance. Safety can be improved by quantifying
the uncertainties of component outputs and propa-
gating them forward through the pipeline. Inter-
pretability is concerned with explaining what the
AV observes and why it makes the decisions it does,
building reassurance with the passenger. Compli-
ance refers to maintaining some control for the pas-
senger. We discuss open challenges for research
within these themes. We highlight the need for
concrete evaluation metrics, propose example prob-
lems, and highlight possible solutions.
1 Introduction
Autonomous vehicles (AVs) could bring great benefits to
society, from reducing1 the 1.25 million annual road fatal-
ities [WHO, 2015] and injuries (100x fatality rate [NSC,
2016]), to providing independence to those unable to drive.
Further, AVs offer the AI community many high-impact re-
search problems in diverse fields including: computer vi-
sion; probabilistic modelling; gesture recognition; mapping;
pedestrian and vehicle modelling; human-machine interac-
tion; and multi-agent decision making.
Whilst great improvements have been made in vehicle
hardware and sensor technology, we argue that one barrier to
AV adoption is within software: particularly how to integrate
different software components while considering how errors
propagate through the system. AV systems are typically built
of a pipeline of individual components, linking sensor inputs
to motor outputs. Raw sensory input is first processed by ob-
ject detection and localisation components, resulting in scene
understanding. Scene understanding can then be inputted
1Most crashes involve human error [NHTSA, 2008, Tables 9a-c].
into a scene prediction component to anticipate other vehi-
cles’ motions. Finally, decision components transform scene
predictions into motor commands. Such components are in-
creasingly implemented with deep learning tools, as recent
engineering advances have dramatically improved the perfor-
mance of such tools [Kendall and Gal, 2017]. Deep learning
methods supersede previous approaches in an array of tasks,
and have become the de facto tools of choice in many ap-
plications. Yet building an AV pipeline out of deep learning
building blocks poses new challenges.
Difficulties with a pipeline arise when erroneous outputs
from one component propagate into subsequent components.
For example, in a recent tragic incident, an AV perception
component confused the white side of a trailer with bright
sky. This misclassification propagated forwards to the mo-
tion planning process, resulting in the first fatality of an as-
sisted driving system [NHTSA, 2017]. Such incidents dam-
age public perception of AV safety, where there is already un-
derstandable concern [Giffi and Vitale, 2017]. Further, whilst
a major goal for society is safer roads, it is not sufficient for
AV software simply to be safe. Passengers need to feel safe in
order to build trust and use the technology. Passenger appre-
hension can arise from both unfamiliarity and a lack of con-
trol over AV decisions. We therefore investigate three under-
appreciated research themes for the successful adoption of
fully autonomous vehicles: safety, interpretability, and com-
pliance (S.I.C. for short).
The Safety theme concentrates on reliably performing to
a safe standard across all reasonable contexts. A crucial re-
quirement for safety is to understand when an AV component
faces unfamiliar contexts. Modelling an AV’s uncertainty is
a sensible way to measure unfamiliarity, and enables appro-
priate subsequent decisions to be made under such uncertain-
ties. Bayesian probability theory is a formal language of un-
certainty, providing tools to model different explanations of
the world. Both interpretability and compliance help reassure
passengers and make them feel safe, as well as to build trust.
Interpretability is concerned with giving insights into the de-
cisions an AV makes, and the outputs it produces. Such in-
sights can take a visual form, be text based, or even auditory.
Two aspects of compliance are of interest: 1) compliance
with passenger preferences; 2) compliance with the law, reg-
ulations, and societal norms. By complying with passenger
preferences (under a safety envelope), passengers can feel re-
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Figure 1: End-to-end Bayesian deep learning architecture. This figure illustrates our architecture and the key benefit of propagating uncer-
tainty throughout the AV framework. We consider a hypothetical situation where an AV (our blue car) approaches an intersection, where
another car (red) will turn left into our path. We compare a framework built on traditional (non-Bayesian) and Bayesian deep learning. Al-
though both systems use the same initial sensory information, propagating uncertainty through the prediction and decision layers allows the
Bayesian approach to avert disaster. Deep learning methods are required for state-of-the-art performance, hence more traditional Bayesian
methods are not possible.
assured they retain high-level situational control. Compliance
with the law, and the integration of regional regulations into
an AV pipeline, is also a crucial requirement which leads to
problems relating to integrating logical rules into deep learn-
ing systems. Research on such problems is extremely sparse,
and we comment on this below.
In this document we survey technical challenges and sug-
gest important paths for future research in S.I.C. from a ma-
chine learning research perspective. We highlight the need for
concrete evaluation metrics, and suggest new metrics to eval-
uate safety by looking at both model performance and model
uncertainty. We suggest example problems in each of the
S.I.C. themes, and highlight possible solutions.
2 Safety
In AV software, no individual component exists in isola-
tion. Improving safety by reducing individual component
errors is necessary for safe AV software—but not sufficient.
Even if each component satisfies acceptable fault tolerances
in isolation, the accumulation of errors can have disastrous
consequences. Instead, an understanding of how errors prop-
agate forwards through a pipeline of components is critical.
For example, in Figure 1, a perception component—which
detects another vehicle’s indicator lights—influences how a
prediction component anticipates the vehicle’s motion, ulti-
mately influencing the driving decision. Since misclassifica-
tion by components early in the pipeline affects components
downstream, at the very least, each component should pass
on the limitations and uncertainties of its outputs. Corre-
spondingly, each component should be able to accept as input
the uncertainty of the component preceding it in the pipeline.
Further, these component uncertainties must be assembled in
a principled way to yield a meaningful measure of overall sys-
tem uncertainty, based on which safe decisions can be made.
A principled approach to modelling uncertainty is
Bayesian probability theory (in fact, it can be shown that a
rational agent must be Bayesian in its beliefs [Berger, 2013]).
Bayesian methods use probabilities to represent uncertainty,
and can be used for each individual component to represent its
subjective confidence in its output. This confidence can then
be propagated forward through the pipeline. To do so, each
component must be able to input and output probability dis-
tributions rather than numbers. Together, component outputs
downstream become functions of the uncertainty in predic-
tions made upstream, enabling a decision layer to consider the
consequences of plausible misclassifications made upstream,
and act accordingly. Other approaches to conveying uncer-
tainty exist in the field, including, for example, ensembling
[Gal, 2016]. But the uncertainties of such techniques cannot
necessarily be combined together in a meaningful way (a ne-
cessity with a complex software pipeline). Further, the type
of uncertainty captured by these methods is not necessarily
appropriate in safety applications (discussed further in x5).
Traditional AV research has used Bayesian tools to capture
uncertainty in the past [Paden et al., 2016]. But the transi-
tion of many such systems to deep learning poses a difficulty.
How would deep learning systems capture uncertainty?
While many Bayesian models exist, deep learning models
obtain state-of-the-art perception of fine details and complex
relationships [Kendall and Gal, 2017]. Hence we propose the
use of Bayesian Deep Learning (BDL). BDL is an exciting
field lying at the forefront of research. It forms the intersec-
tion between deep learning and Bayesian probability theory,
offering principled uncertainty estimates within deep archi-
tectures. These deep architectures can model complex tasks
by leveraging the hierarchical representation power of deep
learning, while also being able to infer complex multi-modal
posterior distributions. Bayesian deep learning models typ-
ically form uncertainty estimates by either placing distribu-
Proceedings of the Twenty-Sixth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI-17)
4746
tions over model weights, or by learning a direct mapping
to probabilistic outputs. One pragmatic approach is to use
dropout to approximate a Bernoulli distribution over the neu-
ral network’s weights. One can then sample from this net-
work with different dropout masks to obtain the posterior dis-
tribution [Gal, 2016, Chapter 2].
Figure 1 illustrates an example where propagating uncer-
tainties throughout the entire pipeline can prevent disaster. It
contrasts standard deep learning with Bayesian deep learning.
In this case, standard deep learning makes hard predictions,
whereas Bayesian deep learning outputs probabilistic predic-
tions accounting for each model’s ignorance about the world.
In this scenario, the AV is approaching an intersection which
has an oncoming vehicle whose intention is to turn across
the path of our AV. Consider the situation where our model
detects the other car, but fails to detect that it is in the turn-
ing lane or that it is flashing its indicator. Using deep learn-
ing, and passing hard classification results through the archi-
tecture, the system would be unable to predict that the on-
coming car might turn. In contrast, a Bayesian deep learning
system might still mistake the oncoming car’s position and
indicator, but it would be able to propagate its uncertainty
to the next layers. Given the probabilities of the other vehi-
cle’s existence, indicator lights, and location in the turning
lane, the prediction component can now compute the proba-
bility that the oncoming would obstruct the AV’s motion. At
the third stage, the decision component reacts to the range of
possible predicted movements of other vehicles, resulting in
a completely different outcome and averting a crash.
Methods for representing uncertainty in deep learning are
critical for safe AVs, and raise many imperative research
questions. For instance: to improve performance, should one
focus on developing a better uncertainty estimate, or a bet-
ter model? These competing hypotheses can be hard to tease
apart. Other important research directions for BDL include
the development of improved inference approximations (ex-
isting approaches can under-estimate model variance through
excessive independence assumptions), and identifying when
a model is misspecified (for example if a priori we give high
probability to incorrect models, and low probability to cor-
rect models). The accumulation of errors arising from various
approximations, such as inference approximations as well as
potential model misspecification, is an important area of open
research.
To assist training and analysing the pipeline as a whole,
we propose that not one, but all components should use BDL
tools. This allows for end-to-end training and the combina-
tion of uncertainties through the pipeline, and also simpli-
fies the writing and maintenance of code (compared to a het-
erogeneous collection of algorithms). Often a modular ap-
proach (i.e. not end-to-end) is taken with AVs, developing
each component independently, since it is easier to validate
and unit-test individual components. However, end-to-end
systems can perform better when the components are opti-
mised jointly, discussed in x5.4.
3 Interpretability
The next theme we review is interpretability. Interpretable
algorithms give insights into the decisions they make, and the
outputs they produce. Such insights could be visual (e.g. a
heat map highlighting model uncertainty), text based (e.g.
asking a system ‘why did you turn left?’), or auditory (an
alarm sounding when the AV does not know what to do, and
the passenger is required to take control). An AV should be
able to explain to a passenger what it observes and why it
makes the decisions it does, rather than expecting passengers
to trust their lives to a black box. Trust increases when a
product is shown to base decisions on environmental aspects
that appear reasonable to a human. Interpretability is useful
when a task is hard to define, or when a model is difficult to
test against the huge variety of possible inputs it could receive
[Doshi-Velez and Kim, 2017].
We highlight several important goals for interpretability:
 to help passengers trust AV technology by informing pas-
sengers what the AV is doing and why,
 to help society broadly understand and become comfort-
able with the technology, overcoming a reasonable fear of
the unknown,
 to aid engineers understand the model to validate against
safety standards,
 accountability for insurance and legal liability by review-
ing and explaining decisions if something goes wrong.
We are particularly interested in interpretability by en-
abling interrogation of the system by the passenger. For ex-
ample, asking, ‘Why did you suddenly shift left?’ should
yield a simple intelligible response from the AV such as ‘I
shifted left to give the cyclist on our right more space’. Such
communication could be done through natural-language or
visual interfaces. Specifically, we discuss two technical as-
pects to this problem: model saliency and auxiliary outputs.
3.1 Model Saliency
Saliency detection methods show which parts of a given
image are the most relevant to a given model and task. Such
visual interpretations of how machine learning models make
decisions is an exciting new area of AI research.
In deep learning, a few techniques have been proposed.
One method uses the derivatives back-propagated through a
network to quantify saliency [Simonyan et al., 2013], but
this often results in low quality pixel-level output. Another
technique is visualising the model’s parameters [Zeiler and
Fergus, 2014] or by perturbing the input [Zhou et al., 2014;
Ribeiro et al., 2016]. [Dabkowski and Gal, 2017] show how
to learn a model to visualise saliency in real-time. When
applied to autonomous vehicle models, research shows that
driving decisions depend most on the boundaries of other cars
and lane markings immediately ahead [Bojarski et al., 2017].
Recent work [Zintgraf et al., 2017] adds an interesting new
element: an input item is relevant if it is important in ex-
plaining the prediction and it could not easily be predicted
by other parts of the input. Such ideas are still in their in-
fancy, and much work is needed before these could be used
for real-world systems.
Bayesian deep learning suggests further ways to interpret
saliency. We can understand how perturbations affect the es-
timated uncertainty in perception, as well as further down the
pipeline. Further research is needed to apply these techniques
in real-time, and to communicate this effectively to users.
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3.2 Auxiliary Outputs
Interpretability is particularly important for end-to-end
systems. One approach to introducing transparency in end-
to-end pipelines is to examine intermediate, or auxiliary, out-
puts. In Section 5 we propose an end-to-end framework to
map sensory inputs to control outputs. However, we also ad-
vocate for human-interpretable auxiliary outputs at each ma-
jor stage. For example, in addition to the end-to-end driv-
ing loss, it would be useful to learn intermediate represen-
tations for depth, motion, geometry, semantic segmentation
and prediction components [Kendall et al., 2017]. These out-
puts may help in training the model by suggesting sensible
intermediate representations, and they provide visual output
to help humans understand and debug the model. Existing
literature on this topic is extremely sparse. One challenge is
to achieve effective intermediate outputs which explain the
model’s representation while maintaining the flexibility of
end-to-end learning.
4 Compliance
The last major theme of research we discuss is compliance.
In our setting, we suggest there are two important aspects to
compliance: passenger reassurance, and law abiding. First,
consider entering a car driven by someone unfamiliar, whose
driving habits quickly make you concerned. You might wish
the driver would slow down, or give the cyclist ahead more
space. With AVs, such compliance to passengers’ high-level
directives could help to reassure them by giving a sense of
control [Baronas and Louis, 1988]. Human drivers can adjust
to non-verbal cues from passengers. If a passenger looks un-
easy, or perhaps if a passenger is clearly holding something
delicate then smoother driving is required. AVs cannot cur-
rently observe such cues, therefore passenger requests to an
AV may be frequent.
Second, compliance also means meeting the requirements
of the law and societal norms. An AV should only accept pas-
senger requests that are safe and legal, hence protecting pas-
sengers from liability in the event of a crash. A manufacturer
(or perhaps the software provider) would need to balance the
flexibility of the operational framework with their own toler-
ance for liability risk.
This theme suggests important new research directions.
Since the community has already identified that vehicle-to-
vehicle (V2V) and vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) commu-
nication protocols would be useful, perhaps an analogous
‘vehicle-to-user’ (V2U) protocol is also possible. Alterna-
tively, a passenger might provide feedback to an AV in pur-
suit of a personalized service. But an individual cannot be ex-
pected to provide thousands of training examples. It is there-
fore important to research methods for data efficient learn-
ing, or more broadly “individualised learning”. We believe
that relevant ideas might come from transfer learning or data
efficient reinforcement learning—learning to comply with a
minimal number of interactions with the passenger. Solutions
to problems arising from this under-explored theme have the
potential to transform our current perception of AVs.
5 Propagating Uncertainty for Safe Systems
We next give a concrete example for realising the ideas
above. We review a typical set of individual components used
in an AV pipeline, and discuss how to propagate uncertainty
between the individual components. We use this example to
highlight concrete problems in S.I.C. AV research.
A variety of AV software architectures exist in the literature
[Luettel et al., 2012; Sivaraman and Trivedi, 2013]. However,
we refer to the generic pipeline structure used in Figure 1 to
guide our discussion on how software components commonly
affect each other. We describe each component’s ability to
handle input and output uncertainty. Note that while Bayesian
probabilistic methods are already ingrained in most robotics
research to provide probabilistic outputs [Thrun et al., 2005],
probabilistic inputs have been explored much less.
Before we begin, it is important to highlight the two major
types of uncertainty we wish to capture with BDL models.
First, aleatoric (data dependent) uncertainty models noise
which is inherent in the observations. Aleatoric uncertainty
reflects the difficulty and ambiguity in the input, for example
an over-exposed image or a featureless wall. Second, epis-
temic (model dependent) uncertainty accounts for ambiguity
in the model itself. This uncertainty can arise, for example,
from different possible ways of explaining the data. Epis-
temic uncertainty can be mitigated given enough data, and
is a measure of “familiarity”—how close a new context is to
previously observed contexts. An example of what these un-
certainties looks like from a prototype scene understanding
system is shown in Figure 2 and Figure 3. We next discuss
architecture pipelines composed of three components: a per-
ception layer, a prediction layer, and a decision layer.
5.1 Perception Layer
A perception system should be able to solve three impor-
tant tasks: estimate the semantics of the surrounding scene,
understand its geometry, and estimate the position of the ve-
hicle itself.
Semantics. The role of a semantic scene understanding sys-
tem is to classify the class and state of the surroundings based
on their appearance. Visual imagery is highly informative but
non-trivial for algorithms to understand. Semantic segmen-
tation is a common task where we wish to segment pixels
and classify each segment according to a set of pre-defined
class labels. For example, given a visual input (Figure 2a),
the image is segmented into road, paths, trees, sky, and build-
ings (Figure 2b). Most algorithms make hard-classifications,
however uncertainty can be captured with semantic segmen-
tation algorithms which use Bayesian deep learning [Kendall
et al., 2015].
Geometry. In addition to semantics, a perception system
must also infer the geometry of the scene. This is important
to establish obstacles and the location of the road surface.
This problem may be approached with range sensors such as
ultrasound or LIDAR. However, visual solutions have been
demonstrated using supervised [Eigen and Fergus, 2015] and
unsupervised [Garg et al., 2016] deep learning (see Figure 3).
Localisation. Finally, a perception system must estimate
the vehicle’s location and motion. In unfamiliar environments
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(a) Sensor input (b) Semantic segmentation (c) Uncertainty
Figure 2: Bayesian deep learning for semantic segmentation. Typically, deep learning models make predictions (b) without considering the
uncertainty (c). Our method proposes to estimate uncertainty (c) from each layer to pass down our Bayesian pipeline. (b) shows semantic
segmentation, where classes are coloured individually. (c) shows uncertainty where colours other than dark blue indicate a pixel is more
uncertain. The model is less confident at class boundaries, distant and unfamiliar objects.
(a) Sensor input (b) Depth prediction (c) Uncertainty
Figure 3: Bayesian deep learning stereo depth estimation algorithm. This example illustrates a common failure case for stereo vision, where
we observe that the algorithm incorrectly handles the reflective and transparent window on the red car. Importantly, we observe that the BDL
algorithm also predicts a high level of uncertainty (c) with this erroneous output (b).
this is commonly referred to as simultaneous localisation and
mapping (SLAM) [Durrant-Whyte and Bailey, 2006]. It is
beneficial to register the vehicle to a global map and also lo-
cally to scene features (such as lane position and distance to
intersection). An AV must infer which lane it is in and where
it is relative to an oncoming intersection. For this task as well
there exist computer vision techniques which use Bayesian
deep learning [Kendall and Cipolla, 2016].
But other problems exist in perception as well, and uncer-
tainty plays a central role in these. Roboticists have long con-
sidered uncertainty in robotic perception. Uncertainty in ge-
ometric features has been considered important for motion
planning [Durrant-Whyte, 1988] and filtering and tracking
[Kalman, 1960; Julier et al., 1995; Isard and Blake, 1998].
Another popular use is sensor fusion, given probabilistic
models of each sensor (a likelihood function). Sensor fusion
combines multiple sensor outputs using Bayes rule to con-
struct a world-view more confident than any one sensor can
alone. The benefit is a principled way to combine all avail-
able information, reducing mapping and localisation errors.
This way of combining sensors of different types, in particu-
lar LIDAR, radar, visual, and infra-red, helps to overcome the
physical limitations of any one individual sensor [Brunner et
al., 2013].
The perceptual component is usually placed at the start of
the pipeline, and has to process raw sensory input. The per-
ception component’s output should consists of a prediction
together with uncertainties, which are useful for outputting
more precise object detection (via filtering and tracking) and
more accurate state estimation (via improved mapping and
localisation). Evaluating a hard decision should not be made
at the output from the perception component. Instead, the
uncertainties should be explicitly propagated forward to the
prediction layer. Most research does not consider uncertainty
beyond this point, but it is a critical input for the follow-up
prediction and decision layers (see Figure 1). Uncertainties
can be propagated as a set of samples from the perception
system’s output distribution, for example. However, this ap-
proach is limited in its use in real-time systems. It is an open
problem to decide on a good representation which captures
the epistemic uncertainty of the perception system efficiently.
5.2 Prediction Layer
Even though scene perception components can identify ob-
stacle locations, many obstacles are dynamic agents such as
pedestrians and vehicles. Scene prediction helps an AV antic-
ipate agent motions to avoid dangerous situations, such as a
vehicle ahead possibly braking suddenly, or a pedestrian pos-
sibly stepping onto the road. Given a typical LIDAR range
(100m) and legal speed limit (30m/s), predictions are gen-
erally not made more than 3.3s ahead.
Given a model of external agents’ behaviour, scene pre-
diction can be framed as a partially observable Markov de-
cision process (POMDP) [Bandyopadhyay et al., 2013]. In
the absence of a model, inverse reinforcement learning (IRL)
can be used [Ziebart et al., 2009]. IRL is the problem of
inferring another agent’s latent reward function from obser-
vations [Ng and Russell, 2000]. An inferred reward function
can then be used in the decision layer to emulate examples of
human driving for example, called apprenticeship learning
[Abbeel and Ng, 2004], or simply to predict external agents’
motions. In this method we learn a reward function given
features from a particular scene, aiming to generalise well to
new scenes [Levine et al., 2010]. Variants of IRL include
Bayesian IRL which use Gaussian processes [Levine et al.,
2011], as do deep IRL which use neural networks [Wulfmeier
et al., 2015a]. Probabilistic deep methods have been intro-
duced recently [Wulfmeier et al., 2015b]. Probabilistic output
predictions of pedestrians or vehicles can be easily visualised,
which is advantageous for debugging and interpretability pur-
poses. For example, heat maps of state occupancy probabili-
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ties might be used [Ziebart et al., 2009]. Other approaches for
prediction try to build an autoregressive model that predicts
future segmentations given visual segments from a perception
layer [Neverova et al., 2017]. Such a method is visually in-
terpretable as well, but inaccurate beyond 0.5s due to lack of
geometrical knowledge.
Input uncertainty, however, has not been investigated with
respect to scene prediction, as far as we are aware. Input
uncertainty outputted by the perceptual layer in object ex-
istence and location would be beneficial for prediction in a
complex pipeline. This can be extremely difficult computa-
tionally to achieve in real-time. If the output of the prediction
layer is a map of occupancy probabilities, the contribution of
each object being tracked could be weighted by its probability
of existence, and convolved with the probability distribution
function of its location for example. This is an example open
problem which has not been addressed by the literature yet.
5.3 Decision Layer
A decision layer commonly includes route planning, mo-
tion planning, and feedback control components to control the
AV [Paden et al., 2016]. For each component, we strongly ad-
vocate a Bayesian decision theoretic approach, with Bayesian
decision theory being a principled methodology to decide on
actions which maximize a given utility function [Bernardo
and Smith, 2001, Chapter 2]. Further, Bayesian decision the-
ory provides a feedback mechanism in which actions can be
taken to reduce the agent’s uncertainty. This feedback is used
to make better informed decisions at a later time (e.g. mov-
ing to get a better view). This relies on tools developed in
the partially observable Markov Decision processes literature
[Astrom, 1965; Sondik, 1971]. Two major tasks for the deci-
sion component is route planning, motion planing.
Route Planning
This task concerns navigation according to an a priori
known graphical structure of the road network, solving the
minimum-cost path problem using algorithms such as A*.
Several algorithms exist that are more suited to large net-
works than A* [Bast et al., 2016]. For many purposes route
planning is mostly a solved problem.
Motion Planning
Given which streets to follow, in motion planning (MP)
we navigate according to the current road conditions ob-
served by the AV’s sensors, taking into account e.g. traf-
fic light states, pedestrians, and vehicles. Most MP meth-
ods are either sample based path planners or graph search
algorithms [LaValle, 2006]. Classical path planning con-
siders an AV’s state space divided into binary ‘free space’
and ‘obstacle’ classes. Uncertainty in localisation and map-
ping will blur such a free-obstacle distinction, which sev-
eral sample based planners consider [Bry and Roy, 2011;
Melchior and Simmons, 2007].
To plan motions well under dynamics uncertainty, an ac-
curate probabilistic dynamics model is critical. While kine-
matic models work well for low-inertia non-slip cases, more
complex models are required to model inertia, and proba-
bilistic models are needed to model slip well [Paden et al.,
2016]. Modelling dynamics uncertainty is especially relevant
for safe driving on dirt or gravel where slipping is common
and should be anticipated [McAllister et al., 2012]. More re-
cently, BDL dynamics models have been used in the design
of controllers [Gal et al., 2016; Depeweg et al., 2016], works
which should be extended into MP.
5.4 An End-to-End Learning Paradigm
In an end-to-end learning paradigm we jointly train all
components of the system from perception, through predic-
tion, and ending in decision. This is an attractive paradigm
because it allows each component to form a representation
which is optimal w.r.t. the desired end task. Alternatively,
training a single component in isolation provides no signal or
knowledge of the end task. For example, training a percep-
tion system in isolation might result in a representation which
equally favours accurate segmentation of the clouds above the
AV compared to identifying the vehicle immediately ahead.
End-to-end training would allow the perception system to fo-
cus its learning on aspects of the scene most useful for the
end task.
However, solely using an end-to-end training signal re-
quires large amounts of data. This is because mapping the
sensory inputs to driving commands is complex. To constrain
the model in a way that learns faster, it is useful to use auxil-
iary losses with each component’s task. This is also important
for interpretability reasons discussed in Section 3. In practice,
we might pre-train individual components (such as semantic
segmentation, prediction, etc.) and then fine-tune them using
end-to-end training with auxiliary losses.
A criticism of the sequential prediction-decision pipeline
architecture is its assumption that the external world evolves
independent to the AV’s decisions. Yet surrounding pedes-
trians and vehicles certainly decide action based on an AV’s
decisions, and vice versa. For example, driving situations
that require multi-agent planning include merging lanes, four
ways stop signs, rear-end collision avoidance, giving way,
and avoiding another’s blind spots. Such multi-agent plan-
ning can be solved by coupling prediction and decision com-
ponents to jointly predict the external world state and the
conditional AV decisions. Such an architecture avoids bas-
ing future decisions on the marginal distribution of future
external-scene states (which is problematic, since in 3-10s,
the marginal probability distribution could cover the entire
road with non-negligible probabilities of occupancy). Con-
cretely, an approach to jointly reasoning about multi-agent
scenarios is probabilistic model based reinforcement learning
[Deisenroth and Rasmussen, 2011], which has been extended
to Bayesian deep learning [Gal et al., 2016].
6 Metrics
Being able to quantify performance of algorithms against
a set benchmark is critical to developing safe systems. It al-
lows acknowledgement of incremental development. Addi-
tionally, it provides an ability to validate a system against a
set of safety regulations. Therefore, a set of specific met-
rics is needed to score and validate a system. Metrics and
loss functions can be difficult to specify without unintended
consequences [Amodei et al., 2016]. Therefore, we wish to
highlight key considerations when designing metrics for AV
classification and regression systems, and specifically under
a Bayesian framework.
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6.1 Uncertainty Metrics
The core benefit of using a Bayesian framework is be-
ing able to propagate uncertainty to improve prediction and
model reasoning. Therefore it is imperative that the probabil-
ity distribution computed by each component accurately re-
flects the true uncertainty in the system. Metrics must capture
the quantitative performance of the uncertainty the model is
trying to measure. Typical metrics should include uncertainty
calibration plots and precision recall statistics of regression
and classification algorithms. Other task-specific metrics in-
clude inspecting test-log-predictive-probabilities—a measure
of how “surprised” the system output is on a test-set of known
outcomes.
It is most important to accurately quantify the uncertainty
of intermediate representations, such as those from percep-
tion and scene prediction components. This is because the
most important aspect is to correctly propagate uncertainty to
the following layers so that we can make informed decisions.
The final control output will be a hard decision. Therefore
uncertainty metrics should focus on intermediate components
and tasks such as perception, sensor fusion and scene predic-
tion.
6.2 End-to-End Metrics
Under an end-to-end paradigm, ultimately we should test
and validate our model using downstream metrics. Metrics
such as ride comfort, the number of crashes and journey ef-
ficiency are what will be used to ultimately judge AVs. Each
component should be judged on its ultimate effects towards
these metrics, rather than in isolation. Does an improve-
ment in component C by measure M correspond well to an
improvement in final vehicle performance P? In isolation, a
trained layer might focus on modelling things which do not
matter to the end task.
Another challenge in quantifying the performance of end-
to-end systems is the attribution of individual components to
end performance. For example, if two components perform
much better when combined in an end-to-end system, rather
than when used individually, how do we quantify their con-
tribution? In game theory, this is answered by the Shapley
value [Sˇtrumbelj and Kononenko, 2014]. However, refining
such approaches and applying them to large scale systems is
challenging.
6.3 Individual Component Metrics
We recognise that while an end-to-end set of metrics is nec-
essary to fully evaluate the safety of a system, individual met-
rics for each module are necessary in practice. This requires
an interpretable system, as the system must expose interme-
diary outputs for analysis (and cannot simply learn an end-to-
end mapping). However, in the robotics and AI communities,
these metrics often do not reflect the end use of the system.
For a safe system, these metrics should be both end-goal re-
lated and also quantify the uncertainty in each module. To
this point, we make some specific suggestions of metrics for
each component to use during development.
Perception Layer Metrics
Currently, low level vision tasks such as semantic seg-
mentation and depth perception focus on improving pixel-
wise metrics such as pixel-accuracy or pixel intersection over
union. However, in an integrated end-to-end system, it is
more important to capture object and obstacle metrics. Ob-
ject false-positive and false-negative scores are more impor-
tant than precise segmentation boundary delineation and pixel
accuracy. For geometry estimation, it is more important
to minimise large failures rather than to improve millime-
tre precision—which can be achieved by considering thresh-
old accuracy metrics rather than metric errors. Consideration
should also be made to develop metrics that reflect the cali-
bration of perception uncertainty outputs. Sensor fusion is an
important process here therefore it is essential for metrics to
quantify relative uncertainty between sensory inputs.
Prediction Layer Metrics
The goal of IRL is to learn a reward function. Exist-
ing IRL metrics in the literature use distances between in-
ferred (and real) functions, e.g. reward functions [Ramachan-
dran and Amir, 2007; Aghasadeghi and Bretl, 2011], value
functions [Levine et al., 2011; Wulfmeier et al., 2015a;
2015b], or policies [Levine et al., 2010; Abbeel and Ng,
2004]. However existing metrics in the field are not ap-
propriate for AVs. Instead, we wish to evaluate proba-
bilistic predictions of agents in continuous 2D maps, there-
fore we assert that log probabilities [Ziebart et al., 2008;
2009] are a better suited metric for AVs. This is especially the
case since motion planning algorithms should be optimised
along a similar metric—e.g. minimising the probability of
collision, which is directly related to the probability of a map
cell being occupied or not. Since IRL relies on reward fea-
tures of scenes to generalise well to new scenes, evaluation
should be done on a new scene to the one the IRL algorithm
was trained on. A test-set of new scenes should be used to
test 1) how transferable the reward features are, and 2) how
well the model uses those features [Levine et al., 2011].
Decision Layer Metrics
The ultimate aim of AV systems is to drive significantly
more safely than human drivers. It is therefore not sensible to
evaluate AVs on how well they emulate human drivers. For
example, several datasets evaluate steering performance by
comparing to human drivers using steering angle RMSE met-
rics. However steering angle RMSE makes little sense in the
absence of destination inputs. Much worse, this metric makes
little sense in the absence of the recorded human driver’s in-
tentions in choosing intersection and lane changes.
Given the probabilistic predictions of external agents such
as the human driver, a more sensible metric for MP is not
immediately clear. However, two suggested options include
minimising either the ‘probability of a collision’ or the ‘ex-
pected number of agents collided with’, as well as taking into
account the ride comfort and distance of the agent from the
desired final destination at the end of the task. Additionally,
it is desirable to be able to choose paths which bound the
probability of collision [Bry and Roy, 2011]. However, the
probability of collisions cannot be the only factor accounted
for (since optimising collision safety alone would result in
the vehicle never moving). A trade-off must be made between
safety and the requirements of the vehicle. This trade-off may
be adjusted by the user for systems which exhibit compliance.
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6.4 AV Classifications
Currently, the accepted standard of AV classification is
SAE J3016 [SAE, 2014]. Whilst the standard focuses on the
degree of human input required, it is also related to the ve-
hicle’s capabilities. The most advanced class is SAE Level
5: ‘the full-time performance by an Automated Driving Sys-
tem of all aspects of the dynamic driving task under all road-
way and environmental conditions that can be managed by a
human driver’. No higher class currently exists. However,
one of the great potentials of AV technology is driving ca-
pabilities that greatly exceed what can be managed by human
drivers. Human drivers are limited by their observational abil-
ities, processing power, and slow reaction times. By contrast,
AVs can access more of the electromagnetic spectrum to bet-
ter perceive through rain, fog, dust, smoke, darkness [Brun-
ner et al., 2013], can have more processing power, and much
faster reaction times. The development of higher SAE Levels
could help encourage AV research to help reach this potential.
7 Conclusions
We believe that autonomous vehicles will bring many ben-
efits to society, while presenting important and fascinating
research challenges to the artificial intelligence community.
In this paper we highlighted three themes which will be crit-
ical for a smooth adoption of AV systems by society. The
first is safety through the use and propagation of uncertainty
from every component throughout the entire system pipeline,
following a principled Bayesian framework. We discussed
the dangers with making hard decisions with perceptual com-
ponents for example, asserting that soft (uncertain) classifica-
tions should be propagated through to the decision layer. This
enables the AV to act more cautiously in the event of greater
uncertainty. To implement each component in a safe sys-
tem, we suggested Bayesian deep learning which combines
the advantages of the highly flexible deep learning architec-
tures with Bayesian methods. We also discussed the themes
of interpretability and compliance as ways to build trust and
mitigate fears which passengers might otherwise reasonably
have about unfamiliar black-box AV systems. Lastly, we dis-
cussed the importance of clear metrics to evaluate each com-
ponent’s probabilistic output based on their ultimate effect on
the vehicle’s performance.
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